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ALSO THIS TERM
99-1295 Gitlitz v. Com'r of Internal Revenue
Ruling below (10h Cir., 182 F.3d 1143):
Shareholder of insolvent subchapter S corporation may not use corporation's untaxed discharge of
indebtedness income to increase shareholder's adjusted basis in corporation's stock; 26 U.S.C. (
108(b)(4)(A), which states that attribute reductions outlined in Section 108(b)(2) shall be made after
determination of tax imposed for taxable year of discharge, is simply designed to compute certain tax
applications before reducing tax attributes, and does not mandate that attribute reductions be made in
tax year following year of discharge of indebtedness, as suggested by taxpayers.
Question presented: Did Tenth Circuit incorrectly hold - in conflict with holdings in United States v.
Farley, 68 U.S.L.W. 1460 (3d Cir. 2000), and CSI Hydrostatic Testers Inc. and Subs. v. Commissioner, 62 F.3d
136 (5h Cir. 1995), affg and adopting opinion of Tax Court, 103 T.C. 398 (1994) - that tax attributes subject
to reduction under 26 U.S.C. § 108(b), including suspended losses of S corporation shareholder, must
be reduced in year that discharge of indebtedness income, excluded under 26 U.S.C. 5 108(a), is
realized, despite statutory requirements that all tax attributes, including suspended losses, be adjusted in
succeeding taxable year, and only after determination of tax for taxable year of discharge?
99-1434 United States v. Mead Corp.
Ruling below (Fed. Cir., 185 F.3d 1304, 68 U.S.L.W. 1128):
Unlike Customs Service tariff regulations, which were held entitled to judicial deference in United States
v. Haggar Appal Co., 526 U.S. 380, 67 U.S.L.W. 4249 (1999), Customs classifications rulings implicitly
interpreting provisions of Harmonized Tariff Schedules of United States are unaccompanied by
procedural safeguards and do not carry force of law, but merely interpret and apply customs laws to
specific set of facts, and thus are not entitled to judicial deference; imported day planners provide for
only brief prospective entries rather than lengthy retrospective entries made in diaries, are held together
by ringed loose-leaf binders rather than permanent fastening, and thus are not subject to tariff
applicable to bound diaries, but instead fall under HTSUS subheading for "other" blank books similar
to diaries that are not subject to tariff.
Questions presented: (1) Are classification rulings issued by Customs Service entitled to deference in
determining proper tariff classification of imported goods? (2) Did Custom Service reasonably interpret
statutory phrase "diaries, notebooks and address books, bound" in Subheading 4820.10.20 of HTSUS
to include spiral-bound and ring-bound day planners imported by respondent?
493
99-859 Central Green Co. v. United States
Ruling below: (9h Cir., 177 F.3d 834):
Damage to pistachio orchard caused by subsurface and surface leakage from irrigation canal that is part
of federal flood control project was not wholly unrelated'Id project, and thus orchard owner's Federal
Tort Clinms Act suit for damages is barred by 33 U.S.C. § 702c, which provides that "[n]o liability of
any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood
waters at any place."
Question presented: Did Ninth Circuit err in concluding that 1928 Flood Control Act immunizes
respondent from this suit?
99-1331 Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine Inc.
Ruling below (8' Cir., 196 F.3d 900):
Neither choice of forum nor right to in personam judgment is "saved" remedy within meaning of
saving to suitors clause of 28 U.S.C.-§ 1333, and thus, in absence of actual conflict between saving to
suitors clause and Limitation of iability Act in suit by vessel owner for exoneration from or limitation
of liability to crw member who was allegedly injured on board vessel, who is sole claimant, and who
was waived Rght to jury trial in'stite court suit for damages based on Jones Act, unseaworthiness, and
maintenance and cure theories, district court abused its discretion in dissolving injunction against state
court suit.
.Qiestidns pres&nted: (1) Did district court abuse its discretion by dissolving injunction against state
co prodedings in single'cliinant limitation of liability case under 40 U.S.C. §§ 181-196, when
claimant guaranteed vessel owner's right to limitation by stipulating that claim does not exceed
limitation fund? (2) If so, must injunction nonetheless be dissolved pursuant to savings to suitors clause
of 28 U.S.C. § 1333(2)?
99-1529 Egelhoff v. Egelhoff
Ruling below (Wash., 139 Wash. 2d 557, 989 P.2d 80, 23 Employee Benefits Cas. 2189):
Employee Retirement Income Security Act does not preempt state statute that revokes, upon
dissoltiion of marriage, former spouse's entitlement to her deceased ex-husband's life insurance
proceeds and pension plan and awards benefits of decedent's pensibn plan and life insurance proceeds
to decedent's children instead.
Questions presented: (1) Does ERISA preempt use of state law to override ERISA beneficiary
designations made pursuant to terms of ERISA plans? (2) Does ERISA's anti-alienation provision, 29
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1), which generally precludes alienation or assignment of ERISA pension plan
benefits, preempt state laws that purport to deprive designated ERISA beneficiaries of their benefits
under ERISA pension plan?
494
99-1792 Missouri Director of Revenue v. CoBank ACB
Ruling below (Production CreditAss'n of Southeastern Missouri v. Director of Revenue, Mo., 1O §W3d 142):
Farm Credit System institutions, as federal instrumentalities, are exempt from corporate income tax
unless Congress expressly cgnsents to such tax, and,,cotwithstanding state revpue director's
contention that by amendingFarm. Credit Act in 1985 -t delete exemption from state income tax,
Congress necessarily intended to consent.to imposition of stateinconxe tax, Coqgress cangot be
deemed to have expressly consented to state income tax by such amendment; accordingly, FCS
member institutions are entitled to refunds on Missouri corporate income taxes that they paid.
Question presented: Does 12 U.S.C. §2134 authorize states to tax income ofNational Bank for
Cooperatives, federally chartered instrumentality of United States?
99-1551 Sentek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.
Ruling below (Md. Ct. Spec. App., 736 A.2d 1104):
Dismissal of diversity suit asserting breach of contract and relate4.tort claims by federal district court in
California on California statute of limitations grounds was dismipal on merits, res judicata effect of
which is determined by federal law; in subsequent suit involving game parties basd on Lgryland law,
Maryland state court was boun4 by res judicata effect, under frderal law, of spel dgnissal, eyren though
claims were not time-barred under.Maryland law.
Questions presented: (1) Is holding in Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 88 U.S. 130 (1874) - that res judicata
effect of judgment of federal court sitting in diversity "is such as -would belong tQ. judgmie of State
courts rendered under similar circumstances" and that "no higher-sant ty or effectcanbe claimed" -
still good law? (2) If Dupasseur is overruled or modified, what shos,4d be res judicataeffect statute of
limitations disraissal in federal court diversity suit?
99-1571 Traffix Devices Inc. V. Marketing Displays Inc.
Ruling below (6th Cir., 200 F.3d 929, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1335):
Utility patent disclosure does not foreclose trade dress protection.
Question presented: Should this court resolve circuit conflict - expr ssly acknowfldfedg nd'depened
by Sixth Circuit below - on whether federal trade dress protection extends to product co raton
covered by expired utility patent?
495
98-1768 Buckman Co; v. Plaintiffs Legal Committee
Ruling below (In n Orthopedic Bone Scr Products Liabiliy Litigatim, 3d Cir., 159 F.3d 817, 67 U.S.L.W.
1312):
State common law claim that medical device manufacturer committed fraud on Food and Drug
Administration in its application for substantial equivalence exception to market approval process is not
preempted by Medical Device Amendments to Food, Drug,And Cosmetic Act.
Question presented: Does federal law preempt state-law tort claims alleging fraud on Food and Drug
Administration during regulatory process for marketing clearance applicable to certain medical devices?
99-1244 GTE Service Corp. v. FCC
Ruing below (Texas Office of Public Utiity Council v. FCC, 5h Cir., 183 F.3d 393):
Federal Communications Commission reasonably interpreted 1996 Telecommunications Act when it
decided that, in determining amount of subsidized support for carrier services to high-cost subscribers,
it would not use costs that incumbent carriers have historically incurred, but would instead use
"'forward-looking" cost model to calculate costs that efficient carrier would incur in serving high-cost
users at below-cost rates; contention that use of forward-looking cost methodology will force carriers
to operate at loss and thereby amount to unconstitutional taking under Bmoks-S canlon Co. v. Railroad
Commission, 251 U.S. 396 (1920), is meritless.
Questions presented: (1) When FCC determined that funding should no longer be based on actual,
historical costs that carriers incur in providing service, but rather should be based on projections of
costs that would be incurred by hypothetical, most-efficient carrier, did Fifth Circuit err by upholding
FCC's approach? (2) Did court of appeals err by ignoring this court's .holdings in Duquesne Light Co. v.
Baracb, 488 U.S. 299 (1989), both that regulator's opportunistic switch in rate methodologies raises
"serious constitutional questions," and that, when there has been switch in rate methodologies,
constitutionality of new method must be tested by detetmining whether it would contimie to provide
constitutionally adequate return on rate base as measured under old methodology? (3) Did court of
appeals err by holding that Duquesne permits FCC to use method for calculating compensation that
systematically fails to recover historical costs, i.e., must "all prudently incurred investment" be counted
in determining whether rate meets constitutional standard of providing "fair return"? (4) Did court of
appeals err by disregarding this court's holding in Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railad Commission that regulated
entity may not be required to operate regulated line of its business at loss on expectation that it will
make up shortfall from competitive lines of business? (5) Did court of appeals err by holding, in
conflict with decisions of other circuits, that it should defer to FCC's interpretation of
Telecommunications Act under Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984), even when FCC's construction raised serious constitutional questions and even when issue
involved constitutional level of just compensation required under Fifth Amendment?
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